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Optimal price subsidies for appropriate 
malaria testing and treatment behaviour
Kristian Schultz Hansen1,2*, Tine Hjernø Lesner3 and Lars Peter Østerdal4
Abstract 
Background: Malaria continues to be a serious public health problem particularly in Africa. Many people infected 
with malaria do not access effective treatment due to high price. At the same time many individuals receiving malaria 
drugs do not suffer from malaria because of the common practice of presumptive diagnosis. A global subsidy on 
artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) has recently been suggested to increase access to the most effective 
malaria treatment.
Methods: Following the recommendation by World Health Organization that parasitological testing should be per-
formed before treatment and ACT prescribed to confirmed cases only, it is investigated in this paper if a subsidy on 
malaria rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) should be incorporated. A model is developed consisting of a representative indi-
vidual with fever suspected to be malaria, seeking care at a specialized drug shop where RDTs, ACT medicines, and 
cheap, less effective anti-malarials are sold. Assuming that the individual has certain beliefs of the accuracy of the RDT 
and the probability that the fever is malaria, the model predicts the diagnosis-treatment behaviour of the individual. 
Subsidies on RDTs and ACT are introduced to incentivize appropriate behaviour: choose an RDT before treatment and 
purchase ACT only if the test is positive.
Results: Solving the model numerically suggests that a combined subsidy on both RDT and ACT is cost minimizing 
and improves diagnosis-treatment behaviour of individuals. For certain beliefs, such as low trust in RDT accuracy and 
strong belief that a fever is malaria, subsidization is not sufficient to incentivize appropriate behaviour.
Conclusions: A combined subsidy on both RDT and ACT rather than a single subsidy is likely required to improve 
diagnosis-treatment behaviour among individuals seeking care for malaria in the private sector.
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Background
Malaria continues to be a major cause of mortality and 
morbidity with 214 million cases and 438,000 deaths 
worldwide in 2014. The majority of all deaths (90%) 
occurred in Africa and with 74% of these in children 
below 5  years [1]. Malaria deaths are largely avoidable, 
as a broad range of effective and cost-effective tools for 
prevention and cure of malaria exists. The cost of pre-
vention per disability-adjusted life year averted ranges 
between US$27–143 [2]. The current manufacturer 
price of artemisinin-based combinations, the most effec-
tive anti-malarials on the market, is about US$2 for an 
adult course and US$0.5 for a treatment course for a 
child under five while the less effective chloroquine costs 
US$0.05–0.15 [3]. Huge investments by governments and 
international donors over the last 10 years have contrib-
uted to the decrease in malaria mortality rates by 25% 
globally and 33% in Africa [4].
One major obstacle to bringing the disease burden fur-
ther down is the widespread problem of inappropriate 
treatment of malaria. Many people infected with malaria 
do not receive an effective anti-malarial (the access 
problem) while a large proportion of people receiving 
treatment for malaria does not suffer from malaria (the 
targeting problem).
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Public health sectors in many countries offer free 
malaria treatment services, but access is impaired by 
frequent stock-outs of drugs, short opening hours, long 
travel distances and prescribed anti-malarials are not 
always artemisinin-based combinations [5–8]. There-
fore, it is common behaviour in many African countries 
to seek malaria treatment in the private sector especially 
at small, specialized drug shops and general stores [9, 
10]. The price of artemisinin-based combination therapy 
(ACT) may be 10–15 times higher than other anti-malar-
ials and many customers instead buy cheaper but much 
less effective monotherapies, sub-therapeutic doses or 
no anti-malarials at all [5, 11–14]. Common anti-malar-
ial monotherapies include chloroquine, sulfadoxine-
pyrimethamine (SP) and quinine [5].
Targeting effective drugs to those who are truly suf-
fering from malaria is hampered by the widespread use 
in many countries of presumptive diagnosis rather than 
more accurate parasitological tests leading to overdi-
agnosis of malaria and underdiagnosis of other dis-
eases [15, 16]. The proportion of parasitological testing 
among patients treated for malaria was estimated to be 
47% in the public sector in the African Region in 2011 
[8] with a considerably lower testing rate in the pri-
vate sector—possibly one-third of the public sector and 
even less frequently in drug shops [17]. Studies across 
different countries and settings have documented that 
between 30 and 80% of people treated with an anti-
malarial do not have malaria parasites in their blood 
[18–25].
With an objective of improving access to high quality 
ACT medicines, both in the public and private sectors, a 
global subsidy paid directly to accredited ACT manufac-
turers was proposed in the early 2000s and subsequently 
operationalized under the name of ‘the Affordable Medi-
cines Facility-malaria (AMFm)’ and hosted by the Global 
Fund [26, 27]. Pilot tests in several malaria endemic 
countries found that such a subsidy achieved consider-
able success in terms of increasing availability of ACT, 
hugely reducing the retail price differences between ACT 
and older, less effective monotherapies in the private sec-
tor and increasing the sales volume of ACT medicines 
[28–31].
Subsidizing ACT medicines may increase access but 
it may also lead to increased treatment of patients not 
suffering from malaria. The World Health Organiza-
tion now recommends that all suspected malaria cases 
should be confirmed with a parasitological test before 
treatment and that positive cases should be treated with 
an ACT [32]. Accurate rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) for 
malaria have recently been developed which are easy to 
use with immediate result, require only limited training 
of providers and could feasibly be sold and performed in 
drug shops and other private sector outlets [8, 33, 34].
The AMFm idea of a global subsidy on ACT has 
recently been abandoned to consider alternative, possi-
bly more cost-effective interventions including increased 
focus on introducing RDTs. In the meantime, individual 
malaria stricken countries may still apply for funds to 
finance ACT medicines and even RDTs from the Global 
Fund [35]. Cohen et  al. [22] conducted a randomized 
controlled trial in rural Kenya to assess the impact of 
changing both RDT and ACT prices through the use 
of subsidies. They found that ACT use increased 59% 
in presence of a subsidy of 90%—but only 56% of those 
buying ACT test positive for malaria. However, they also 
found that targeting increased to 81% when the sub-
sidy for ACT was slightly reduced (from 90 to 80%) and 
the freed resources directed to an RDT subsidy of 85% 
instead. This increased the testing rate more than 50% 
and had no significantly negative effect on ACT uptake.
In this paper the characteristics of an optimal subsidy 
policy will be investigated when a health planner has 
the objective that suspected malaria patients should be 
diagnosed and treated according to WHO guidelines. 
The focus is on the private sector, in particular private 
drug retailers. These are an extremely important source 
of anti-malarial treatment and the problem of inappro-
priate treatment of malaria is common in terms of fre-
quent sale of less effective drugs (non-artemisinins) and 
parasitological testing being the exception rather than 
the rule. An analytical framework is developed based on 
expected utility theory where a representative individual 
with suspected malaria has to make a choice at a drug 
shop regarding purchasing an RDT and a type of anti-
malarial. The framework also contains a health planner 
who can influence the prices of RDTs and ACT at drug 
shops using subsidies. Optimal subsidy levels for RDTs 
and ACT are explored within this framework and sup-
plemented by numerical simulations to investigate the 
influence of key factors such as the prior belief of the 
individual that the fever is due to malaria as well as his/
her trust in the accuracy of RDTs. The results from this 
framework suggest that exclusively subsidizing ACT, as 
proposed by the AMFm approach, is in general not suffi-
cient for incentivizing the individual to behave as desired 
by the health planner. A price reduction on RDTs is nec-
essary as well and the optimal use of subsidy funds is a 
combined subsidy on RDT and ACT. The present paper 
complements the paper by Cohen et  al. [22] by explic-
itly modelling both the subsidy choices of a public health 
planner and the household decision making by house-
holds. This framework enables a search for an ‘optimal’ 
combination of RDT and ACT subsidy levels.
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Methods
Model of individual behaviour in malaria 
treatment‑seeking in the private sector
A simple decision model is developed where a repre-
sentative febrile individual can choose among different 
strategies involving choice of drugs and whether to take a 
parasitological test before treatment. The focus is here on 
malaria treatment and testing strategies and there are two 
possible health states: The individual either has malaria 
or not malaria. Vm is the utility of having malaria and 
Vnm is the utility of not having malaria with Vnm > Vm. 
The utilities Vm and Vnm may be thought of as express-
ing monetary values so that Vnm − Vm is the willingness 
to pay to avoid malaria. The individual does not know for 
certain whether the fever is malaria or not but holds a 
belief p (a subjective probability) that the fever is malaria. 
This belief is affected by the result of an RDT. Define pp 
as the belief that a fever is malaria having observed that 
the RDT result is positive, whereas pn is the belief that 
a fever is malaria having observed that the RDT result is 
negative. It is assumed that pn < p < pp, so that a posi-
tive RDT result will increase the individual’s belief that 
the fever is malaria while a negative RDT result will 
decrease the belief that the fever is caused by malaria. If 
the individual has complete confidence in the accuracy 
of the test, i.e. believes that there are no false positive or 
false negative test results, then pp will be equal to 1 and 
pn will be equal to 0. Let us call p∗ the individual’s belief 
that the test result will be positive. From p, pp and pn 
the following can be defined p = p∗pp + (1− p∗)pn, and 
therefore
The belief p∗ may not necessarily be equal to p if for 
instance the individual is concerned that the RDT will 
occasionally miss positive malaria cases (false negatives) 
in which case p∗ will be lower than p. Similarly, the indi-
vidual holds beliefs that two available types of drugs, 
monotherapy and ACT, will cure malaria, EMT and EACT 
where EACT > EMT. The retail prices of the drugs are 
denoted CMT and CACT, where CACT > CMT, and with 
the price of the test denoted CRDT. Values of beliefs p, 
pn , pp, EMT and EACT fall between 0 and 1 while prices of 
drugs and RDT are positive.
One possible strategy for the individual is to do noth-
ing about the fever if it is believed to be self-resolving, a 
strategy that will be denoted SNO, another is that the indi-
vidual seeks treatment at a drug shop or another private 
health provider if he believes the fever to be caused by 
malaria. While it is a possibility that the fever is caused 
by a serious non-malarial disease, the focus is here on 
whether it is malaria or not and it is assumed that the 
individual will seek care at formal providers in case a 
p∗ = (p− pn)/(pp − pn).
fever is expected to be a serious non-malarial disease. In 
the drug shop, the individual faces the following options: 
(a) buy cheap, less effective antimalarial monotherapy 
such as chloroquine or SP, strategy SMT , (b) buy more 
effective but also more expensive ACT, strategy SACT or 
(c) buy a rapid diagnostic test (RDT) and let the subse-
quent decision of buying an ACT medicine, monotherapy 
or no drugs depend on the result of the test. The decision 
to purchase an RDT will lead to nine possible strategies. 
One example of a strategy is that the individual purchases 
a cheap anti-malarial monotherapy if the RDT is positive 
and does not buy any anti-malarials if the RDT is nega-
tive, strategy SRDT(MT ,NO). The possible strategies of the indi-
vidual are represented graphically in Fig. 1.
All possible strategies involve risky outcomes and it is 
assumed that the individual chooses the strategy with the 
highest expected utility U. The expected utility of buying 
no drugs and without having a test is:
The expected utility of not purchasing a test or drugs 
is therefore the belief that the fever is malaria times the 
utility of having malaria plus the belief that the fever is 
not malaria times the utility of being free of malaria. The 
expected utility of buying a cheap anti-malarial mono-
therapy without having a test is:
The expected utility is the probability of being cured 
for malaria after taking monotherapy times the util-
ity of being malaria free (first term) plus the probability 
of monotherapy not working times the utility of having 
U(SNO) = pVm + (1− p)Vnm
U(SMT ) = pEMTVnm + p(1− EMT )Vm
+ (1− p)Vnm − CMT
Do nothing
Buy mono-
therapy Buy ACT
Buy RDT
Posive
Negave
Buy ACT Do nothing
Buy ACT
Do nothingBuy mono-
therapy
Buy mono-
therapy
Fig. 1 Diagnosis-treatment strategies
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malaria (second term) plus the belief of the fever not 
being malaria times the utility of being malaria free (third 
term). In addition, the retail price of anti-malarial mono-
therapy must be subtracted. Likewise the expected utility 
of buying an ACT medicine without having a test is:
with a similar interpretation as above.
The utility of a strategy of buying first an RDT followed 
by the purchase of a course of ACT if the test is positive 
and not purchase any drugs if the test is negative is:
The first component of the expected utility consists 
of the belief that the RDT will be positive, p∗, times the 
utility of taking a course of ACT and with a belief that 
the fever is malaria adjusted upwards from p to pp . 
The second component is the belief that the RDT will 
be negative, (1− p∗), times the utility of not taking any 
anti-malarials and with a belief that the fever is malaria 
adjusted downwards from p to pn. Finally, the third 
component is the RDT price, CRDT, which must be sub-
tracted. The expected utility function for the remain-
ing eight RDT-strategies arising from the decision tree 
in Fig.  1 can be written in a similar fashion (Additional 
file 1).
Some of the possible strategies are not rational. Con-
sider a strategy consisting of first purchasing an RDT 
associated with a decision to purchase an ACT medi-
cine irrespective of the test result (SRDT(ACT ,ACT )). It would 
make more sense to save the money for purchasing an 
RDT and instead go directly to acquiring an ACT medi-
cine: The strategy SRDT(ACT ,ACT ) is dominated by the strat-
egy SACT. It also seems irrational to choose a strategy of 
buying the most effective and expensive drug only when 
the test is negative like the strategy SRDT(MT ,ACT ). It can be 
shown formally that six such strategies are suboptimal 
(see Additional file 2 for details). Consequently, a rational 
individual will choose from the remaining six strategies: 
SACT, SMT , SNO, SRDT(ACT ,NO), SRDT(MT ,NO) and SRDT(ACT ,MT ).
The objective of the health planner
A health policy planner is now introduced who wants the 
current malaria treatment guidelines as recommended by 
WHO to be followed: All suspected malaria cases must 
be diagnosed with a parasitological test before treatment 
and patients with confirmed malaria should be treated 
with an ACT while patients with a negative test should 
not receive an anti-malarial [32]. An individual visiting a 
U(SACT ) = pEACTVnm + p(1− EACT )Vm
+ (1− p)Vnm − CACT
U
(
SRDT(ACT ,NO)
)
= p∗
[
ppEACTVnm + pp(1− EACT )Vm
+
(
1− pp
)
Vnm − CACT
]
+
(
1− p∗
)
[(1− pn)Vnm + pnVm]− CRDT
drug shop does not necessarily behave according to the 
guidelines. For instance, if the expected utility for the 
individual of strategy SACT is higher than the expected 
utility of strategy SRDT(ACT ,NO) then the individual will pur-
chase an ACT directly rather than following the strategy 
advised by the health planner. However, the health plan-
ner could potentially reverse the ranking of these two 
strategies by changing the relative prices of ACT and 
RDT through subsidies. This will be the case if a combi-
nation of subsidies can be found such that the utility of 
strategy SRDT(ACT ,NO) is higher than the utility of strategy 
SACT, when the prices are reduced due to the subsidies. 
Similar conditions are needed to ensure that the utility of 
strategy SRDT(ACT ,NO) is higher than the remaining four non-
eliminated strategies. There are therefore five conditions 
which are presented in Additional file  3 as inequalities 
(1)–(5).
There may be more than one combination of ACT and 
RDT subsidy levels ensuring that the individual prefers 
strategy SRDT(ACT ,NO) to all other strategies. The health plan-
ner therefore has as an objective that the total subsidy 
cost should be minimized subject to the constraint that 
the treatment guidelines are followed. In general, total 
subsidy cost for the health planner of a combination of 
subsidy levels is:
where βACT is the subsidy cost per ACT course, βRDT is 
the subsidy cost per RDT and p˜ is the probability that an 
RDT will be positive which depends on the malaria para-
site prevalence among individuals visiting drug shops 
and the accuracy of the RDT. Positive RDT results will 
include both true and false positives and p˜ can be writ-
ten as
where p¯ is the malaria parasite prevalence among febrile 
individuals visiting drug shops while ssRDT and spRDT 
are the sensitivity (probability of a positive test for an 
infected person) and specificity (probability of a negative 
test result for an uninfected person) respectively of the 
RDT.
The decision problem of the health planner consists of 
minimizing total subsidy cost (6) over subsidy levels for 
ACT and RDT subject to inequalities (1)–(5) listed in 
Additional file 3 being simultaneously obeyed.
Searching for optimal RDT and ACT subsidies: individual 
beliefs and numerical simulations
There is no general solution to this optimization problem 
as it will depend on specific values of prices and parame-
ters. Therefore, an approach is followed where a series of 
(6)Total subsidy cost = βACT ∗ p˜+ βRDT
p˜ = p¯ ∗ ssRDT + (1− p¯) ∗ (1− spRDT )
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numerical examples will give indications on what combi-
nations of subsidies on ACT and RDT incentivize appro-
priate behaviour and have the lowest total subsidy cost 
for the health planner. Two sets of numerical assump-
tions are applied related to (1) prices and RDT accuracy 
and (2) beliefs of the individual with fever.
(1) The retail prices, drug effectiveness and RDT accu-
racy listed in Table 1 are intended to represent ‘the aver-
age’ or ‘a common’ situation in sub-Saharan Africa. It is 
assumed in the numerical examples that subsidies will 
directly change retail prices corresponding to an assump-
tion that the subsidy is perfectly passed on to individuals 
visiting private sector providers. For instance, if a sub-
sidy is 75%, then the individual will pay only 25% of the 
pre-subsidy price. This approach to subsidization in the 
analysis may therefore be interpreted as a subsidy on the 
retail prices facing the individual in contrast to the AMFm 
approach where the subsidy is given to ACT medicine 
manufacturers at the top of the supply chain [28].
In the model above, monetary (US$) retail prices are 
converted into a price comparable to the utility model 
using a linear transformation where the monetary prices 
are divided with the individual’s willingness to pay 
(WTP) for avoiding malaria illness. Unfortunately, an 
empirical estimate of such a WTP does not exist. Instead 
a contingent valuation survey from Uganda is relied on 
which found an average WTP for an adult course of ACT 
of US$2.05 among drug shop customers who were asked 
their valuation of a course of ACT after having purchased 
an RDT that turned out positive [36]. Because this is a 
WTP for a specific drug to cure malaria and not as such 
a WTP to avoid malaria in the first place, the estimate of 
US$2.05 is considered as a lower bound and a WTP of 
US$3.00 is used as the best guess.
(2) An individual may hold different beliefs with respect 
to the fever being malaria (p) and change this belief after 
RDT testing (pn and pp). Large differences between p on 
the one hand and pn and pp on the other indicate high 
trust in the RDT result. There is evidence that people 
have strong beliefs in a positive test result but the belief 
in a negative test result typically varies and can be quite 
low [37, 38]. Methods have recently been developed that 
may be used to elicit empirical values of p, pn and pp 
from population members in specific settings as has been 
done in western Kenya [39]. For the numerical exam-
ples, individual beliefs from low to high are used except 
in the case of a positive RDT result where the individual 
always has high trust in the test. Total subsidy cost (6) is 
influenced by the extent of the malaria problem among 
individuals visiting drug shops so the impact of different 
malaria prevalences on subsidy levels of RDT and ACT is 
also investigated.
To gain intuition on the subsidy sizes that are needed to 
fulfil the health planner’s objective for a range of different 
beliefs of the individual, a series of numerical examples or 
simulations are developed using the parameter values 
described above. The calculations are performed using 
linear programming methods to ensure that the costs of 
the health planner are minimized by finding the minimum 
subsidy levels of ACT and RDT that at the same time 
ensure that incentive constraints (1)–(5) listed in Addi-
tional file 3 hold for an individual with given beliefs and a 
given set of parameter values (from Table 1).1
Results: optimal subsidies for RDT and ACT
Figure 2 presents a situation where an individual has a 
low belief that the fever is malaria, a low trust in a neg-
ative RDT result, a high trust in a positive RDT result 
and with low parasite prevalence among individuals 
visiting drug shops. Such an individual may be incentiv-
ized always to purchase an RDT before treatment and 
buy an ACT medicine only in the case of a positive RDT 
result if the combined subsidies on RDT and ACT are 
on the solid line. For example, the individual will behave 
appropriately if the RDT subsidy is 93% and the ACT 
subsidy is 81% and also if the RDT subsidy is 97% and 
the ACT subsidy is 54%. Note that even if the RDT is 
free (100% subsidy) a positive ACT subsidy is required. 
In addition, the individual will only behave appropri-
ately if the RDT subsidy is at least 93%; any RDT subsidy 
below this value will lead to inappropriate behaviour 
irrespective of the level of subsidy on the ACT—if the 
RDT is too expensive relative to ACT, the individual will 
go directly to buying ACT medicines without taking an 
RDT first.
The dotted line in Fig.  2 shows combinations of ACT 
and RDT subsidies giving equal total subsidy cost for 
the health planner (the sum of subsidy cost of ACT and 
RDT). The further to the south-west this line is situated, 
the lower the total subsidy cost. The optimal combina-
tion of subsidies from the health planner’s point of view 
is the point of tangency between the two lines at 96% 
subsidy on the RDT and 54% subsidy on the ACT since 
this will at the same time ensure appropriate behaviour 
of the individual and the lowest possible subsidy cost of 
the health planner. The total subsidy cost at this point is 
US$2.08 per individual.
Optimal subsidy combinations in  situations of differ-
ent beliefs of the individual and malaria prevalence are 
presented in Table  2. Among the beliefs investigated, it 
is not possible to ensure appropriate behaviour by sub-
sidizing only ACT or RDT. The subsidy policy must be 
1 In practice, a linear optimization model was set up in Excel and the solv-
er’s LP simplex function was applied.
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a combined subsidy on both commodities characterized 
by a high subsidy on the RDT of 80–96% of the retail 
price and a more moderate subsidy on the ACT in the 
range 54–76%. The intuition behind such a subsidy pat-
tern is that in this model a low price of RDT is required 
to ensure that the individual is willing to purchase a test 
before treatment combined with a moderately reduced 
ACT price still high enough to ensure adherence to the 
RDT result. If the ACT price is too low, the individual 
may decide always to purchase an ACT medicine even if 
the RDT is negative and if the ACT price is too high, the 
individual may choose to purchase monotherapy even 
when the RDT is positive.
For some combinations of beliefs of the individual, 
there are no solutions to the problem meaning that no 
subsidies can be found to incentivize the individual to 
behave appropriately. This was found to be the case if 
the individual has a strong prior belief in being malaria 
positive (40% and above) and at the same time a weak 
belief in a negative test result.
The calculations performed further suggest that low 
confidence in a negative RDT result requires a higher 
RDT subsidy compared to high confidence while the 
ACT subsidy is not affected. No associations are appar-
ent between RDT and ACT subsidy levels and the degree 
of belief that the fever is malaria and the malaria preva-
lence among individuals visiting drug shops. Finally, the 
total subsidy costs are higher for increasing malaria prev-
alence and for decreasing belief in a negative RDT result.
Sensitivity analyses are performed using the lower and 
upper bound parameter values in Table  1. Higher retail 
prices of ACT medicines and RDTs lead to higher subsidy 
costs (Table 3). However, a higher price on anti-malarial 
monotherapy may actually lead to lower required subsi-
dies on RDT and ACT and lower subsidy cost, as a higher 
price on monotherapy makes it less attractive to follow 
strategies involving buying these drugs. Note that using 
the lowest bound estimate on ACT prices means that 
ACT should in fact be taxed and not subsidized to incen-
tivize optimal behaviour.
It is also investigated how changes in monotherapy 
effectiveness affect the results (Table  4). A lower effec-
tiveness of monotherapy will, all else equal, make it less 
attractive for the individual to buy monotherapy and 
thus easier for the health planner to incentivize the use 
of ACT. However, the effect of monotherapy effectiveness 
on RDT uptake is not straightforward as a higher relative 
(perceived) effectiveness of ACT means that the individ-
ual needs a larger incentive to buy an RDT before buying 
an ACT medicine. The beliefs of the relative effective-
ness of the different treatment types are, therefore, also 
important for reducing total subsidy costs.
Discussion and conclusions
The simulations using the framework developed sug-
gested that irrespective of the beliefs of the representa-
tive individual, the optimal subsidy policy of the health 
Table 1 Retail prices excluding subsidies and parameter values used in numerical simulations
#  This price guide reports manufacturer prices and in order to arrive at estimates of retail prices a mark-up of 100% is assumed as found in a market survey [50]
&  Non-artemisinin monotherapy
Description Parameter Best estimate Lower bound Upper bound Source
Retail price of monotherapy#,& CMT US$0.3 US$0.1 US$1.6 [3, 44]
Retail price of ACT# CACT US$3.5 US$1.0 US$10.0 [3, 17]
Retail price of RDT CRDT US$1.8 US$0.5 US$2.93 [3, 17]
Effectiveness of monotherapy& EMT 50% 20% 70% [45, 46]
Effectiveness of ACT EACT 95% 90% 99% [47]
RDT sensitivity ssRDT 95% 86% 99% [48, 49]
RDT specificity spRDT 95% 75% 99.8% [49]
Fig. 2 Optimal combination of RDT and ACT subsidies ensuring 
appropriate behaviour for a representative individual. Individual 
characterized by low belief that a fever is malaria (p = 0.20), low trust 
in negative RDT result (pn = 0.15), high trust in positive RDT result 
(pp = 0.97) and low malaria prevalence (p¯ = 0.15)
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planner would involve a shared subsidy on RDT and 
ACT. In other words, the individual with fever would 
not be incentivized to behave appropriately through a 
subsidy on the RDT or the ACT alone. Even in a situa-
tion where the individual has high trust in both positive 
and negative RDT results, it would still be necessary to 
Table 2 Optimal combinations of RDT and ACT subsidies for different beliefs of a representative individual and malaria 
parasite prevalence
– No solution
Individual beliefs with respect to: Malaria  
prevalence (p¯)
Subsidy in  % Total subsidy cost 
per individual in US$
Fever is malaria (p) Negative RDT (pn) Positive RDT (pp) RDT ACT
0.20 0.03 0.97 0.15 88.4 54.0 1.94
0.20 0.03 0.97 0.35 88.4 54.0 2.28
0.20 0.03 0.97 0.50 88.4 54.0 2.54
0.20 0.03 0.97 0.70 88.4 54.0 2.88
0.20 0.15 0.97 0.15 96.1 54.0 2.08
0.20 0.15 0.97 0.35 96.1 54.0 2.42
0.20 0.15 0.97 0.50 96.1 54.0 2.68
0.20 0.15 0.97 0.70 96.1 54.0 3.02
0.40 0.10 0.97 0.15 80.0 76.0 1.93
0.40 0.10 0.97 0.35 94.5 54.0 2.39
0.40 0.10 0.97 0.50 94.5 54.0 2.65
0.40 0.10 0.97 0.70 94.5 54.0 2.99
0.40 0.35 0.97 0.15 – – –
0.40 0.35 0.97 0.35 – – –
0.40 0.35 0.97 0.50 – – –
0.40 0.35 0.97 0.70 – – –
0.60 0.15 0.97 0.15 82.9 68.3 1.93
0.60 0.15 0.97 0.35 82.9 68.3 2.36
0.60 0.15 0.97 0.50 82.9 68.3 2.69
0.60 0.15 0.97 0.70 98.1 54.0 3.05
0.60 0.55 0.97 0.15 – – –
0.60 0.55 0.97 0.35 – – –
0.60 0.55 0.97 0.50 – – –
0.60 0.55 0.97 0.70 – – –
0.80 0.20 0.97 0.15 90.1 60.6 2.01
0.80 0.20 0.97 0.35 90.1 60.6 2.40
0.80 0.20 0.97 0.50 90.1 60.6 2.68
0.80 0.20 0.97 0.70 90.1 60.6 3.06
0.80 0.75 0.97 0.15 – – –
0.80 0.75 0.97 0.35 – – –
0.80 0.75 0.97 0.50 – – –
0.80 0.75 0.97 0.70 – – –
Table 3 Sensitivity analysis of prices of ACT, RDT and monotherapy
Results are presented for an individual with p = 0.6, pn = 0.15, pp = 0.97 and malaria prevalence is p¯ = 0.5
ACT price RDT price Monotherapy price
ACT % RDT % Cost ACT % RDT % Cost ACT % RDT % Cost
Best estimate 68.3 82.9 2.69 68.3 82.9 2.69 68.3 82.9 2.69
Lowest bound −11.0 82.9 1.44 68.3 38.4 1.39 No solution No solution No solution
Highest bound 88.9 82.9 5.94 68.3 89.5 3.82 51.1 67.9 2.12
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subsidize both the RDT and the ACT. Simulations fur-
ther found that the optimal policy incorporated a high 
subsidy on RDT and a more moderate subsidy on ACT 
(Table 2). Previous empirical research has provided some 
support for a combined subsidy. Cohen et  al. [21] pro-
vided subsidized RDTs to drug shops in Uganda but no 
subsidy on ACT treatment and found that among cus-
tomers buying RDTs only 32% of RDT-positive patients 
purchased an ACT. Contrary to this, the introduction 
of both subsidized RDTs and ACT medicines in Ugan-
dan drug shops resulted in high willingness to purchase 
an RDT before treatment and with almost all RDT-pos-
itive customers also buying an ACT and RDT-negative 
patients not buying an anti-malarial [40]. A similar 
study involving a combined subsidy among Kenyan drug 
shops also improved appropriate behaviour among drug 
shop customers but to a lesser extent [22]. These stud-
ies therefore point to different subsidy recommenda-
tions than the original AMFm approach which proposed 
subsidizing only ACT at a very high percentage of up to 
95% of the manufacturer price [27]. The main objective 
of the latter was improving access to high quality ACT 
medicines and less concern for overprescription of ACT 
to patients with no malaria parasites in their blood [26].
It was found that a solution to the decision problem 
could not be identified in all situations including if the 
individual was highly convinced that his fever was malaria 
even before considering a test and at the same time had a 
very high distrust in a negative RDT result. Such an indi-
vidual would prefer to purchase an anti-malarial without 
first taking a test as was also confirmed for some set-
tings in a model-based study involving six African coun-
tries [41]. Qualitative research has confirmed that some 
patients and child caregivers indeed have confidence in 
their own ability to recognize malaria symptoms [37, 38]. 
In addition, perceived benefits of parasitological diagno-
sis among customers in the private sector are negatively 
affected when the risk of taking anti-malarials is per-
ceived to be minimal, the concerns for delayed treatment 
of the true cause of fever if not malaria are minimal or 
believing more in an approach where different drugs are 
taken until one proves effective (diagnosis-by-treatment) 
[37, 38, 42]. If such perceptions are common, the subsidy 
instrument must be supplemented by a behaviour change 
communication campaign addressing unfortunate behav-
iours in a particular community.
A key parameter influencing the optimal subsidy struc-
ture in the present model is the degree of belief in a nega-
tive RDT result. The higher the mistrust in a negative 
RDT result, the higher a subsidy on RDTs is required. 
Mistrust in negative test results has been a matter of 
great concern for a long time in malaria care and sev-
eral studies have indeed demonstrated a significant ten-
dency to disregard negative RDT and microscopy results 
both among health providers and patients [22, 37, 43]. 
However, more recent studies indicate a higher belief in 
negative test results e.g. Mbonye et al. [40]: Following an 
information campaign on the advantages of RDTs and 
ACT treatment for malaria, RDTs were introduced in 
drug shops in an area of Uganda. The study found a high 
willingness to purchase a subsidized RDT among drug 
shop customers with fever and a nearly complete accept-
ance of negative RDT results as measured by the finding 
that almost all RDT-negative customers did not buy an 
ACT. This is encouraging since a high level of belief in 
the accuracy of the RDT will in the model require a lower 
RDT subsidy and lead to a lower overall subsidy cost.
The model developed for the presented analysis is a 
simplification in at least three respects. It was assumed 
that there is only one representative individual (or many 
identical individuals), that there are no drugs for non-
malarial fevers offered at drug shops and that drug shops 
have a very simplified behaviour limited to wanting to 
sell RDTs and anti-malarials at the market price or at the 
subsidized price without any other considerations such 
as maximizing their own profit. One first possible expan-
sion of the model could be allowing for many individuals 
with heterogeneous beliefs in for instance negative RDT 
results or the conviction that their fever is malaria. This 
would not change the health planner’s decision problem 
in principle, but instead of one set of constraints ensuring 
that the representative individual prefers the appropriate 
treatment strategy to any of the other strategies, it would 
require at set of constraints for each type of individual. It 
is also likely that the health planner is not able to find an 
RDT and ACT subsidy allocation that will simultaneously 
ensure appropriate behaviour in all drug shop customers. 
As shown above, individuals with certain beliefs cannot 
Table 4 Sensitivity analysis of monotherapy effectiveness
All other parameters are best estimate parameter values from Table 1. Results are presented for an individual with p = 0.6, pn = 0.15, pp = 0.97 and malaria 
prevalence is p¯ = 0.5
Monotherapy effectiveness ACT % RDT % Total subsidy cost per individual in US$
Best estimate (50%) 68.3 82.9 2.69
Lowest bound (20%) 52.9 69.4 2.17
Highest bound (70%) No solution No solution No solution
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be incentivized into appropriate behaviour through the 
use of subsidies. The health planner will therefore have 
to decide on the minimum acceptable share of drug shop 
customers behaving appropriately.
Another possible extension to the model is assuming 
that a wider range of drugs relevant for fevers are avail-
able at drug shops such as antipyretics and antibiotics. 
Such an extension to the model would lead to an increase 
in the possible strategies of the individual due to a higher 
number of drugs and possibly also diagnostic tests. Iden-
tifying the optimal subsidy strategy is a significantly more 
complicated decision problem and will require further 
research.
A third possible extension to the model is allow-
ing a more realistic behaviour of drug shops involv-
ing for instance consideration on how to maximize 
their profit. Drug shop behaviour may also be analysed 
under different market conditions facing drug shops 
in the community including monopoly, a situation with 
few competitors or many drug shops leading to per-
fect competition. Such extensions are likely to affect the 
assumption that the entire subsidy amount is passed on 
to customers. As a result, the health planner’s problem 
will be much more complicated to solve since it must be 
determined first what shares of the subsidies are passed 
on to the customers before the optimal combination of 
RDT and ACT subsidies can be identified.
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